what is usually thought to be implied by materialism, and will probably seem too restrictive. Nevertheless, I shall argue that it is logically implied by any view of man which remains true to the rationale of materialism. That accounts for the first half of my paper. In the second half (secs. II-IV) I shall expound and discuss a certain objection to materialism. The form the objection takes is suggested by the arguments used in the first half. If I am right in both halves of my paper, all materialist theories of man are false. If I am right in the first half but wrong in the view I defend in the second, a materialist theory of man is true. If (to be more realistic) I am wrong in both, the discussion may still help to clarify some of the issues.
I
If men were as Descartes describes them, they would of course not be mere physical objects. For although a Cartesian man, being spatially extended, could properly be described as a physical object, he would be more than that, since part of him-his soul--would be by definition non-physical. Thus if Descartes' view of the nature of man were correct, an exact physical replica of a given man would not necessarily be an exact replica of that man-unless by natural necessity a soul were automatically assigned to it. This suggests an approach to the explanation of the materialist's dictum that man is nothing but a physical object. For the dictum seems to imply that any exact physical replica of a man would be in all respects a replica of that man, not because something was automatically added to his physical replica, but nothing to him over and above wh in physical terms. I shall now try express this idea.
First, what is it for one thing to be replica' of another? One possible defi of properties. We might say, for exa replica (physical replica) of anothe exactly the same properties (physical But a glance at the literature suggests avoid the notion of a property, if th propose to make do with the reaso description, hoping thereby to circum which tend to obscure talk of prope properties at precisely the places whe An exact replica of a given object same types of causal relations as x d positions in space or time. In gener logically depend, for their applicat circumstances will not necessarily app exactly similar to x. (Note that th here must be logically necessary. For or even all of the properties of ph causally dependent on their partic may distinguish two main classes o be ruled out of consideration. The fir tion to the given object x depends log or future existence of certain parti will be all those descriptions which descriptions, or indicator words su it is not sufficient to exclude only as is shown by such examples as 'ex We must exclude all descriptions depends logically on the existence o when these are not actually componen conditions appear to be jointly suf therefore define the class of non-relat those descriptions of x whose applica pendent of the existence (past, pre In order to define the notion of a physical replica I want to use the notion of a 'purely physical vocabulary'. Instead of defining it, however, I propose to assume that some reasonably clear specification has already been provided. It might perhaps be explained as 'vocabulary sufficient for describing all the features of non-living things'; or as 'vocabulary of contemporary physics'; or the materialist might simply, if tediously, list his preferred vocabulary. I do not think that the difficulty of specifying the favoured vocabulary is serious. True, the materialist's thesis becomes vaguer the less precisely the vocabulary is defined; and the richer the vocabulary is allowed to be, the less interesting the thesis. But imagine what it would be like if materialists had managed to show convincingly that the applicability to human beings of such descriptions as 'has an after-image', 'feels faint' could, without running into philosophical difficulties, be wholly explained on the basis of contemporary physics and chemistry. That would be a marvellous achievement; and neither the fact that physics and chemistry will probably be revised, nor the absence of any very precise general account of what is to be counted as 'physics' or 'chemistry', would diminish its interest or importance. My arguments will not be significantly affected if I simply assume that the 'purely physical vocabulary' has been adequately specified.
With that understood, 'physical replica' can be defined thus: y as at t, is a physical replica of x as at tx if and only if every non-relational description in the purely physical vocabulary which applies to x at t, applies also toy at t2. We are now better equipped for the attempt to clarify the implications of materialism. First, notice maintains that man is nothing but a phy agree that:
(A) Any physical replica of a given man as at a given time would also be a replica of that man as at that time.
It may seem obvious that materialism has this implication, but since the point plays a vital part in my argument, some further remarks are in order. Consider the case of materialism about stones, a view to which I suppose we all subscribe: 'stones are nothing but physical objects'. One could not be said to hold that view unless one agreed that for any given stone s, every physical replica of s as at a certain time would be in all respects a replica of s as at that time. For to admit some actual stone was such that certain non-relational descriptions which applied to it would not also apply to every physical replica of it would be to say that there was more to the stone than there was to things which were exactly similar to it in all physical respects, things which were 'nothing but physical objects' in a very clear sense. In other words, it would be to contradict the slogan. That stone, at least, would be more than a mere physical object. I conclude that materialists could not avoid commitment to (A) even if they wished to (not that there is any reason to suppose they do).
However, while it is necessary, if one thinks that man is nothing but a physical object, to agree that any physical replica of a given man would be a replica of that man, it is not also sufficient. A dualist could hold that we inhabit a world in which anything answering to the purely physica descriptions of a given man as at a certain time would be by natural necessity endowed with all those non-physical features which (in his view) the man possessed at that time. But thi consideration suggests the possibility that a neat explicatio of the materialist's slogan, and so of materialism, might result from adding to (A) the condition that it be true by logical o conceptual necessity:
(B) The mere fact that someone is a man entails that any physical replica of him as at a given time would also be a replica of him as at that time.
This would certainly be a materialist view of man; and th form of (B) might even serve for an adequat of a materialist view of sticks and stones. Ho porary materialists are usually willing to admit conceivably have been more to a man than his p features; they only maintain that in fact there (Perhaps there are a priori arguments which sho view but materialism is even logically tenab be rash to define materialism on the assump arguments were forthcoming.) So we must e account permits the materialist to say, if he wi only happen to be nothing but physical objects. account meets this requirement:
(C) Every non-relational description whic given man at a given time is entailed junction of all the purely physical no descriptions which apply to him at that tim (C) avoids the objection just mentioned bec open the logical possibility that someone shou yet fail to be the subject of purely physical des actually entailed whatever other non-relation applied to him. The proponent of (C) would in world as it is, the purely physical description human being-including, of course, physiologi or their physical-language equivalents, and ph lawlike generalisations-do entail whatever other nonrelational descriptions also apply; but he would allow it to be a matter of contingent fact that human beings conform to physical descriptions of these kinds. Thus while (C), like (B), is not merely consistent with (A) (the requirement that any physical replica of a given man would also be his replica), but also offers an explanation of (A) by entailing it, (C) avoids the extreme of implying that materialism is necessarily true. Now (C), or (as it may be helpful to call it) the Entailment Thesis, is itself entailed by analytical behaviourism, when that is taken to be the view that all psychological concepts are analysable in terms of mere bodily movements and dispositions to move; and it is also entailed by the conjunction of a causal analysis of psychological concepts with the highly even on the widest possible interpretation of entailmen However, our earlier considerations make it possible to se that this would be a mistake. Let us take 'entail' as it occurs in the Entailment Thesis in the widest possible sense, so that p entails q if and only if there are some logical or conceptua considerations as a result of which it is impossible that p should be true and q false, or (for the case of descriptions) impossible that p should apply to something to which q does not also apply. Then (surprising as this may appear) very little additional argument is required to show that on this interpretation the Entailment Thesis is not only sufficient, but necessary, for any materialism worthy of the name. (I am using such phrases as 'entail' and 'logical or conceptual' as blunt instruments, by the way. For those with Quinean scruples they may, I think, be acceptably paraphrased without impairing the argument 'p entails q' might, for example, be rendered 'inclusion of both "p" and "not-q" in our sentence-systems would be more than difficult: it would make the systems unworkable'.)
The additional argument required is very straightforward. The Entailment Thesis would be false if, and only if, there were a man whose non-relational physical descriptions at a certain time did not entail the totality of non-relationa descriptions which applied to him at that time. But such a man could not sensibly be described as 'nothing but a physical object'. For reasons we have already glanced at, he would be more than that. What would undoubtedly be nothing but physical object, and that in a transparently clear sense, is physical replica of the man to which there applied only the physical descriptions and whatever they entailed-something we may conveniently dub a 'Zombie replica'. Since the man would differ from his Zombie replica, but not in ways describable in purely physical terms, he would not be 'nothing but a physical object ', or The materialist might perhap 'nothing but a physical object' may sense from the one I have given it, could be true even if the Entailment Thesis were false. But if there is such a sense-and the onus of explaining it would be on the materialist-I do not think it could help him to escape the main point of the argument. For suppose the Entailment Thesis is false, so that it is logically possible that a man should stand side by side with a Zombie replica of himself.
Then to say that the man and the Zombie would both be 'nothing but physical objects' would leave the differences between them-differences signalled by the fact that some non-relational description which applied to the man failed to apply to his Zombie replica-wholly inexplicable in physical or neutral terms. Ex hypothesi these differences could not be captured in the net of the most sophisticated physical investigation: physics and chemistry would be blind to them. A dualist could happily swallow all this; but it cannot be passed off as the pure milk of materialism.
For similar reasons the materialist cannot avoid commitment to the Entailment Thesis by invoking the Identity Thesis. Suppose that (the 'havings' of) sensations, after-images, and so forth are held to be identical with certain states or processes describable in the purely physical vocabulary. (Here it is not important to know just what is supposed to be identical with what.) The materialist will either agree that these identifications are actually entailed by the purely physical descriptions, in which case he accepts the Entailment Thesis; or he will deny it. But to deny it is to admit that no logical or conceptual considerations whatever preclude the possibility that there should have been a race of beings physically indistinguishable from ourselves-our Zombie replicas-to which there failed to apply some of the non-relational descriptions which apply to us. Such a race of Zombies would indeed have been 'nothing but physical objects'.2 But to say there could have been such a race is to say that we are not mere physical objec differ from them in having after-images, sensatio -yet physics and chemistry could provide explaining or even recognising such differences.
statements of psycho-physical correlations or famous 'nomological danglers'-were either p the present assumption) entailed by physica be any need for materialists to decide whether sense, the various alleged identities hold. For th also because it requires no commitment to cont about analysability or translatability, the Enta enables many current objections to materialis stepped. However, attractive though I persona position, reflection on the idea of Zombie repli to the conclusion that it is not in fact true. In the remainder of this paper I shall try to explain why.
II
Consider Gulliver in Lilliput. The Lilliputians were fully justified in treating Gulliver as a sentient being (i.e., for our purposes, as having sensations). After all, he was very like themselves, except for his relatively vast size. But would Lilliputian philosophers have been right if they had said that not only did Gulliver's behaviour and dispositions to behave justify the inference that he was sentient, they actually entailed that he was sentient? No. For the truth-although this has not hitherto been recorded-is that although Gulliver had started life as a human being, he was one no longer, having met in his travels with the foll encountered a race of beings e putians, and technologically muc selves. A team of their scientists ( his head, disconnected the nerves t rendered it inert, and arranged to afferent nerves from the remainder send outputs via the efferent nerv indistinguishable from that of a n had thus taken over those functions of Gulliver's brain which governed his behaviour, and their zealous commitment to their project ensured that the entity of which they formed a part was disposed to behave like a man. I will refer to this entity as 'Zulliver'. Now I doubt if anyone would want to say that Zulliver had sensations. But even if someone did maintain this view, it is clear that Zulliver's having sensations is not entailed by the fact that he (or it, but I shall use 'he') behaved and was disposed to behave in all respects like a man. For Zulliver was nothing but a super-puppet, with resident puppeteers. This blocks the entailment because, if we know that a certain body is being manipulated as a puppet, we know that what appear to be expressions of the feelings of the being whose body it is are nothing of the sort. (Usually they are not even expressions of the puppeteers' feelings.) Yet it is only because the body seems to express feelings that it is up for consideration as the body of a sentient being at all. This argument applies not only to pantomime horses and Zulliver, but also (for example) to the sophisticated electrical manipulation of human beings, whereby it might be possible for the experimenter to cause someone's body-under anaesthetics, perhaps-to go through an extended sequence of evolutions which, had they occurred naturally, would rightly have been regarded as expressions of various coherent thoughts and feelings.
Zulliver seems to me to be a decisive counter-example to analytical behaviourism, including that less vulnerable variety which does not insist on the possibility of piecemeal behavioural analyses of mental concepts, but only on the claim that the psychological vocabulary provides no more than ways of talking about behaviour and behavioural dispositions. But it will be more useful for our purposes to consi Zulliver is also a counter-example to causal an those advocated by Armstrong and Lewis.
According Now in Zulliver's case there is a state typically caused by (say) damage to his bodily tissues, and typically resulting in certain sorts of behaviour (winces, groans, etc.). (It is a state of the Brain Team more particularly, since the Brain Team responds to the neural inputs by arranging for just those behavioural responses to be produced.) And since it does not follow from this that Zulliver feels pain, Zulliver appears to be a counter-example to Lewis's scheme of analysis. The causal functions supposed to be analytically correlated with pain are performed, yet the fact that they are performed does not entail that Zulliver feels pain. However, we must attend to the way in which the word 'typically' occurs in Lewis's scheme. The point of saying that x is an experience of type Tif and only if x is typically caused by C and typically produces E is to avoid such objections as that of the paralysed man: a view on which total paralysis necessarily involved the total absence of experiences would be highly counter-intuitive. By not requiring that experiences of type T always produce E, Verificationistic support for the Entailment Thesis is also vulnerable to the Zulliver example. When the Lilliputians, or for that matter Zulliver's normal-sized contemporaries, described and treated him as having thoughts and feelings, they did so because he was to them indistinguishable from a normal man. They did not have to decide whether or not to treat him as sentient: the question simply did not arise. And of course they were fully justified in treating him so. Nevertheless, for the reason given earlier, the fact (assuming it is a fact) that he resembled a normal man in all behavioural and other externally observable respects does not entail that he wa sentient. Indeed, for the same reason-that he was, in eff a puppet-I think most people who knew the facts would inclined to deny that he was sentient. The same reason, again warrants the statement that it is perfectly intelligible describe Zulliver as insentient. Yet although his phys description does not entail that he was sentient, neither does entail that he was insentient. We all know we are sentient; an no doubt we also know there are no little men inside our
heads. Yet the first item of knowledge does not entitle us exclude a priori the possibility that we might have been mi taken about the second. My knowledge that my head aches not, so far as I can see, logically or conceptually incompatib with the discovery that the inside of my head is like the insid of Zulliver's. If this is correct, the intelligibility of describing "Those trees you admired", a friend once said to simply sticks groping for chemicals". (In just such a t are nothing but physical objects" echoes round dus rooms.) What made possible the clipping of the an was the plausibility of supposing that trees must be m than that in order to account for their evident proper better science provides debunking explanations. W hardened to such dispersion of magic. "A Will-o'-t just moving marsh gas"; "A Brocken spectre is only t ver's shadow on the cloud". Someone who knows demonstrates that a phenomenon that seemed to need at least this to explain it requires only that or merely the other. Similarly, Mr Kirk sometimes describes materi a debunking rejoinder to the claim that particu must be explicable in terms of special ingred what it would be like if materialists had manag vincingly that the applicability to human beings tions as 'has an after-image', 'feels faint', could, into philosophical difficulties, be wholly ex basis of contemporary physics and chemistr of explanation has he in mind? Is it like the Jack-o'-Lantern in terms of rising marsh gas ? W of explanation would proceed "on the basis o physics and chemistry" ? If materialism is to be non-scientists can reasonably take sides, this ne Suppose the town council threatens to remove to make a new roundabout and it is objected that ancient landmark. If a councillor replied, "sto but physical objects", we should not all subscrib The purveyors of such sentiments do not int with what scientists discover about dandelions times they unwisely make this point by sayi cerned with non-physical or immaterial thin ingly suggests the super ingredient, the peren or immortal spark that survives earthly vi 'spiritualist' reminder about what is involved in now appears after all as a controversial challe accounts of human beings. He should have sa more to knowing a person than knowing his p all talk of non-physical parts as a confusion. So minds us that there is more to a human being cannibal is not in dispute with someone who te that far from all things nice she consists of so much carbon and so on.
The materialist counterclaim that people are physical objects is infected by the ambivalence of It has the tone of debunking science when it t that human beings can be "explained" withou extra ingredients unknown to physicists. Yet it shock comes from the feeling that it denies the tr the spiritualist rightly insists. But it is silly to den and, if anyone had challenged scientific accounts would be unprofitable for non-scientists to debate sophical thesis, materialism makes the mistak before it finds out what, if anything, has been sa Philosophers are neither specially knowledgea ally ignorant of either human beings or the w being". They would be wise to avoid anatomical or debates. "People are physical objects" may rem people are not equations, r6les or institutions.
would no doubt all subscribe to a materialism about stones which reminded us that stones are not square roots, distances or pay differentials. At the same time we would equally subscribe to the 'spiritualist' reminder that people are not only physical objects-that they differ from other non-abstractions in various ways, that they have a complexity and importance over an above comparable lumps of matter.
Disputes break out when the spiritualist tries to tangle with the scientists or when the materialist overrides our ordinar understanding of what a person is in the name of science. "For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (engines that more themselves by springs and wheel as doth a watch) have an artificial life ? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joints, but so many Wheels, giving motion to the whole body ... " (Hobbes-introduction to Leviathan.) Now here is someon blinded by mechanics who had forgotten the differences be tween clocks and people, between movement and action. It i no criticism of that mechanics to point out that in explaining movements it has not explained actions. Nor, obviously, must we suppose that there are non-mechanical springs and whee that do explain life, or that life cannot be scientifically ex plained. Certainly there can be non-physical parts. G arguments, performances, may be made up of v Honesty may be a part of Simon's character and be an element in his mental or intellectual m physical things have non-physical parts. But dualist was that minds are mental constituents o Simon himself has non-physical parts. It is rathe suggested that not only does the knight in a chess cal parts-the head unscrews from the base-b non-physical parts, for part of its power is to cap occupying the square on which it lands. Even tho is defined by its power and its power has part parts of the knight. Similarly, honesty may be character or, if you like, his mind, but neither mind are parts of Simon. A person's states, char activities are not mental or physical constituent Mr Kirk thinks that the materialist is committed to the thesis that "every non-relational description which applies to a given man at a given time is entailed by the conjunction of all the purely physical non-relational descriptions which apply to him at that time". This claim that all true descriptions of people are physical descriptions seems to me to hang in the air for want of an explanation of "physical". Now for the gulling of the Lilliputians, who mistakenly supposed they were dealing with a human being when they were faced with "nothing but a super-puppet, with resident to persons in the latter. The 'behaviourist' claim presumably ought to be more like this: when a person (who is awake and informed of his situation) moves and is disposed to move in certain ways it follows that he has acted in a certain way.
Zulliver, not being a person but "a super puppet with resident puppeteers", cannot be a counter example to this.
Zulliver may be intended to be a counter example to the thesis that certain descriptions of the movements and sounds that an entity makes entail that that entity is a person. Our Lambert Simnelacrum moves as a person, makes the right noises, whilst remaining a fairly obvious pretender. If we take a limited range of movements and so forth, other interpretations -the robot, the man in the chess playing machine-are clearly possible. But the "analytical behaviourist" is allowed to appeal It is surely absurd to attribute knowledge or headaches to puppets, so we are not being asked to speculate, "Maybe I'm a super puppet with resident puppeteers". Mr Kirk's 'cogito' is, rather, "I (know that I) am sentient, even though the inside of my head is exactly like that of a puppet except that someone is inside who is responsible for all those movements and changes which it would be reasonable for an outsider to interpret as actions or expressions of mine". The question is whether something with such a constitution can be said to speculate. Any speculative noises or marks that issue from it will be by courtesy of the inner man. Certainly there could be slugs and snails or little green men inside Gulliver; but it is not obviously intelligible to suppose that the little men produce all Gulliver's personal reactions. It begs the question to insist that at least Gulliver could doubt whether he is sentient. If he doubts, he is a person. But if little green men produce all the changes in the entity we took to be Gulliver then it seems inappropriate to attribute doubt here.
The description of Zulliver ("A team of their scientists had invaded his head . . . so as to produce behaviour indistinguishable from that of a normal man") cannot, on Mr Kirk's own view, be a physical description, since we surely cannot have scientists, invaders, mimics or chiefs without consciousness. A physical description would have stayed at the level of ganglions and haemoglobin, of this electrical impulse producing that chemical reaction. When we talk of a Brain
Team we have already interpreted the physical phenomena and it is this interpretation which makes us suppose Zulliver insentient.
If the movements of an alleged chess-playing machine are caused by an internal or external controller we deny that the machine plays chess. It is tempting to suppose that when we say a person does play chess (think hard, miscalculate etc.) then we must be referring, however vaguely, to some other causal story which is characteiistic of human behav easy to believe that internal structure and functi utmost importance to whether a given 'entity' i Hobbes' view that "life is but a motion of limbs whereof is in some principal part within" is ech rated by contemporary theorists.
But it is important to notice that the mere fa by inner men did not lead us to deny that the m chess (or that Zulliver was sentient). be counter examples where the causal role of not guarantee an action and where the causal little men etc. does not mean that the movement loses the name of action. The beginning of motion not only has to be within: it has to have a life-giving character. Thus it is that the brain, on many accounts (especially in psychology), is said to think, decide, receive and send messages, operate limbs and so forth. But those are precisely the kind of personal descriptions which a causal account was intended to elucidate. This seems to me a fatal inadequacy in such an account.
It is Mr Kirk's view that sentience depends on "private access", which is logically independent of the physical facts. Psychological descriptions requiring private access are said to be such that "for their correct application on any given occasion, one individual is in an epistemological unique position: a position where he, but no one else, is able to apply the description correctly without needing access to what is publicly observable". This explanation certainly lets in too much. If a man, but no one else, hears his wife's voice in the next room he is now probably able to apply many non-psychological descriptions that others can't apply. He may also know that in about an hour the door will open (for he has decided to go out then). But "the door will open" is not a psychological description.
In general, talking of private access and contrasting this with public observation points misleadingly to the common idea that sentience is a matter of private observation, whereas it is not a matter of observation or detection at all. What can be observed or detected can also be unobserved and undetected. This is not true of sensations. Nor is having sensations a matter of being able to apply a certain kind of description, or else animals, let alone prawns, would be indubitably insentient. But, having finally arrived at the most sensitive area in the ticklish debate about zombies, I scratch about in vain for fresh observations.
